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HOME RULE: Constitutionally Granted Planning
and Zoning Powers vs. State Concern for
Preservation of the Adirondacks
The trend toward regional and statewide land use controls' has
raised a cry of protest from municipalities and landowners that such
controls deprive local governments of planning and zoning powers.2
Fearing parochialism, 3 proponents of regional legislation argue that
local governments are no longer capable of dealing with increased
urbanization or environmental concerns that transcend municipal
borders.4 By contrast, supporters of local autonomy consider plan-
1. A model form of regional and statewide legislation developed by the American
Law Institute with explanations of intent and effect is contained in AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, A MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
CODE]. See Dunham, Regional and State Land Policy in a Home Rule Selling, 1975
INST. ON PLAN., ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 89; Mandelker, The Role ofthe Lo-
cal Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976); Rose,
From the Legislatures: State Government Role in Land Use Planning and Control is
Growing, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 809 (1974); Schnidman, The Courts Enter the Zoning
Game.- Will Local Government Win or Lose, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 590 (1975);
Sussna, Recent Developments in Land Use Control, 1977 INST. ON PLAN., ZONING AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 29; Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of Recent Legisla-
tive 4pproaches, 56 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1972).
2. See, e.g., CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974) (state coastal zone act did not preempt a local
ordinance because permit required by the state act was in addition to locally required
permits), Carlson v. Village of Worth, 25 Ill. App. 3d 315, 322 N.E.2d 852 (1974),
afl'd, 62 I11. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1976) (local environmental protection ordinance
preempted by state EPA); New Carrolton v. Belsinger Signs, 266 Md. 229, 292 A.2d
648 (1972) (zoning power vested exclusively in park commission precludes municipal-
ities from exercising zoning power contained in statewide grant). See generally Note,
Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737
(1959).
3. See MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at 248.
4. Id.
[I]n Florida one of the major sources of opposition to the proposed Everglades
Airport was fear that local governments would encourage the development of
commercial and industrial facilities in the area around the airport. In California
the willingness of each local government around San Fransisco Bay to see its
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ning and zoning a uniquely local affair affecting population density,
municipal growth, and city values.' The New York Court of Appeals
resolved such a conflict in favor of regional controls in Wambat Re-
alty Corp. v. State,6 holding that constitutionally required procedures
for encroachments on local planning and zoning powers do not bar
the state from enacting a comprehensive zoning plan for the
Adirondack Park.
share of the Bay filled to encourage new development raised the prospect that the
Bay would be turned into a river.
In New Jersey the failure of the local communities to agree upon a plan for the
Hackensack Meadows stymied the development of this important area for many
years. In Massachusetts the failure of the Boston suburbs to accept lower-cost
housing caused concern that people of lower income would be denied access to
rapidly-increasing suburban job opportunities. In Colorado the inability of rural
counties to control second home subdivisions created great popular dissatisfac-
tion.
Id at 249.
See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 374, 285 N.E.2d 291, 299, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 148, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (court decried notion that
local governments have exclusive control over land use functions, indicating that such
diffusion of function often creates planning which ignores the broader public interest);
Haar, Regionalism andRealism in Land- Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1957);
Sandalow, The Limits of Municoal Power Under Home Rule.- A Role for the Courts,
48 MINN L. REv. 643, 705 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sandalow] ("[Alt the present
time there is an increasing awareness that municipal land use policies, particularly in
metropolitan areas, do have a substantial impact upon surrounding communities.").
See also F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CON-
TROL (1972); Schoenbaum & Silliman, Coastal Planning. The Designation and Man-
agement of Areas of Critical Environmental Concern, 13 URBAN L. ANN. 15 (1977).
Florida enacted a statute based upon MODEL CODE, supra note I, art. 7, to protect
critical areas of state concern. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979).
The Administration Commission, which is given power to supersede regulations not
complying with the principles of the Act, designates "critical areas." Id § 380.05.
Additionally, local governments may not change regulations for land development
without consent. Id § 380.05(6). This Act has not been challenged as interfering
with local planning and zoning powers, perhaps because-unlike New
York-Florida's delegation of such powers is not protected by the state constitution.
However, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated this Act on the grounds that the
delegation of power to the Administration Commission lacks adequate standards.
Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, - So. 2d - (Fla. 1978).
5. See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.03 (1968):
Land-use restriction is assumed to be a problem which can be solved more effi-
ciently on the local level. The rationale of this policy was articulated by Chief
Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals: "A zoning resolution in
many of its features is distinctively a city affair, a concern of the locality, affect-
ing, as it does, the density of the population, the growth of city life, and the
course of city values."




The Adirondack Park is a unique combination of state-owned for-
est preserve and privately-owned land comprising a total of six mil-
lion acres. New York has protected the forest preserve from
spoliation by constitutional provisions, statutes, and strict judicial de-
cisions, for over eighty-five years.7 The first regulation of the Park's
privately-owned lands8 was the Adirondack Park Agency Act
(APAA),9 which adopted a comprehensive land use plan for the en-
7. The forest preserve was first created by statute in 1885. 1885 N.Y. LAWS ch.
283. The statute directed that all lands owned or later acquired by the state of New
York within certain counties be forever kept as wild forest lands and provided that
they should not be sold, leased, or taken by any corporation, public or private.
The Adirondack Park was established and placed under the control of the forest
commission in 1892. 1892 N.Y. LAWS ch. 707. The constitutional protection pro-
vided two years later, N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 7 (1895), extended the statutory protec-
tion by providing that timber on state forest preserve lands could not be sold,
removed, or destroyed. The purchase of 80,000 acres of land for the Adirondack Park
was authorized the same year (1895 N.Y. LAWS ch. 561).
The courts have consistently upheld protection of the state-owned Adirondack Park
lands. See Black River Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 307 N.Y. 475,
121 N.E.2d 428, 92 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1954) (upholding validity of a statute prohibiting
construction of a reservoir); Association for Protection of Adirondacks v. MacDonald,
253 N.Y. 234, 170 N.E. 902, 239 N.Y.S. 31 (1930) (invalidating a statute authorizing
the Conservation Commissioner to build a bobsled run for the 3rd Olympic Games in
1932 at the expense of four acres of timber [Park's acreage at that time: 1,941,403
acres] and noting that constitutional amendments had been required in 1918 and 1927
to cut timber to build roads through the park); People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 39 A.D.
34, 56 N.Y.S. 869 (1899) (upholding the right of the state to condemn lands for the
park and forbidding railroads through the Park); Helms v. Diamond, 76 Misc. 2d 253,
349 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1973) (upholding validity of the portion of the APAA prohibiting
landing of seaplanes on bodies of water wholly bounded by state land in the Park and
ruling that the pre-existing nonconforming use exception of the APAA applied only
to privately-owned Park lands).
8. The opening of Interstate Highway 1-87 linking Montreal and New York City
put the Park within a day's drive of 55 million people. The resulting tourist business
and great surge in demand for second homes transformed the private lands scattered
throughout the park from service areas for the protected wilderness into areas threat-
ening the "scenic, aesthetic, wildlife, recreational, open space, historic, ecological and
natural resources of the ...Park." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 801 (McKinney 1972) as
amended (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978).
The purchase of huge tracts of land by nonresident development corporations
(24,300 acres by the Horizon Corp. of Tucson, Arizona and 18,500 by Luis Paparazzo,
a Conneticut developer) brought fears of large second home developments, strip de-
velopment along travel corridors, and water pollution, all of which have caused great
problems in the Catskill area to the south of the Park. NATURAL RESOURCES DE-
FENSE COUNCIL, INC., LAND USE CONTROLS IN NEW YORK STATE 108, 109, 118-19,
134-35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NRDC].
9. Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 27, §§ 801-819 (McKinney
1972) as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978). For an extensive discussion of the
1979]
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tire Park area. The APAA required plaintiff, a private developer, to
seek approval of a proposed subdivision from the Adirondack Park
Agency (Agency). Although the development was permissible under
local resolutions,' ° the Agency refused to approve the application.
Plaintiff challenged the validity of the APAA, charging that it com-
pletely suspended planning and zoning powers expressly delegated to
local governments by constitutional and statutory home rule provi-
sions." I Plaintiff argued further that in New York the legislature may
repeal, impair, diminish, or suspend powers delegated to local gov-
ernments only by a "double enactment procedure" consisting of en-
actment and approval in two successive calendar years. 2 Despite the
fact that the APAA was enacted only once, the court upheld its valid-
ity on summary judgment by determining that preservation of the
APAA by the Senior Attorney of the Adirondack Park Agency, see Booth, The
Adirondack Park Agency Act.: A Challenge in Regional Land Use Planning, 43 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 612 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Booth]. See Davis, Land Use Control
and Environmental Protection in the Adirondacks, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 189 (1975).
10. 41 N.Y.2d at 492, 362 N.E.2d at 583, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 951. In addition to this
lawsuit by the developer, the Town of Black Brook also challenged the validity of the
Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 27, §§ 800-819 (McKinney 1972)
as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978) in Town of Black Brook v. State. 41
N.Y.2d 486, 362 N.E.2d 579, 393 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1977). The court acknowledged the
town's standing to question the constitutionality of an act of the legislature but con-
sidered the issue foredoomed by the decision in Wambat.
11. N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(b)(1) "[The legislature] shall enact ... a statute of
local governments granting to local government powers ... in addition to the powers
vested in them by this article." Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the New
York Legislature adopted the Statute of Local Governments. N.Y. STAT. LOCAL
Gov'Ts LAW (McKinney 1969). The statute granted local governments -[T]he power
to adopt, amend, and repeal zoning regulations" Id § 10(6); and "the power to
perform comprehensive or other planning work relating to its jurisdiction" Id at §
10(7).
12. N.Y. CONST. art IX § 2(b)(1): "A power granted ... may be repealed, di-
minished, impaired or suspended only by enactment of a statute by the legislature
with approval of the governor at its regular session in one calendar year and the re-
enactment and approval of such statute in the following calendar year." N.Y. STAT.
LOCAL GOV'Ts LAW § 2 (McKinney 1969) contains substantially the same language.
See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
New York utilizes the double enactment procedure to require many of the legisla-
tors to face the voting public before a second vote on the subject and to "'afford locali-
ties protection from hasty and ill-considered legislative judgments." Wambat Realty
Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d at 492, 362 N.E.2d at 583, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The double
enactment procedure also applies in areas other than home rule. For example, "No
law diminishing the area of the Adirondack [Park] ... shall be effective unless en-
acted by the legislature at two successive regular sessions." N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV.




Adirondack Park qualified as a substantial state concern and was
therefore immune from the double enactment procedure. 13
In the absence of statutory or constitutional delegations of power,
states possess plenary authority over local governmental affairs. 4
Virtually all states, however, have statutory or constitutional "home
rule" provisions which grant cities, counties, or other local govern-
ment units the authority to regulate local affairs. An important dis-
tinction between constitutional and statutory home rule manifests
itself in the procedure required to change the theory or effect of
home rule. Generally, the legislature may revoke powers granted by
statute while powers granted by constitution fix the authority of the
state with respect to local self-government.' 5 Otherwise, constitu-
13. "'The short of the matter is that neither Constitution nor statute was designed
to disable the State from responding to problems of significant State concern."
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d at 497, 362 N.E.2d at 586, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
954.
14. See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.02 (1968); F. SMITH, JU-
DICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK 1906-1938, at 115-35 (1952);
Sandalow supra note 4, at 645; Note, Municial Home Rule in New York, 20 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 201, 202 (1954); Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1966); Note, Home Rule.- A Solution for Municipal Problems?,
16 Wyo. L.J. 47, 49 (1961).
The forerunners of municipal home rule grants were statutes restricting the states'
power to legislate regarding the internal municipal affairs of individual cities. Such
restrictions permitted "special laws" relating to the affairs of a particular city with the
city's consent only, but allowed "general laws" relating to the affairs of all cities
within a class. This "special law/general law" distinction still exists in many home
rule jurisdictions. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX § 2(b)(2); Sandalow, supra note 4, at 648.
For a thorough discussion of the special legislation background to home rule amend-
ments, see H. McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE,
64-108 (1916).
15. N. LITTLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME
RULE 14 (1962); Sandalow, supra note 4, at 669.
As conflicts arise between state land use statutes and local zoning ordinances,
courts generally place some degree of reliance on the source of local legislative power.
In Colorado, for example, state legislation may preempt zoning ordinances of statu-
tory cities but not of cities deriving their home rule power from constitutional provi-
sions. See. e.g., Service Oil Co. v. Rhodus, 179 Colo. 335, 500 P.2d 807 (1972)
(constitutional home rule city has power to terminate a non-conforming use that has
been destroyed without the fault of the owner regardless of contrary statutes); Moore
v. Boulder, 29 Colo. App. 248, 484, P.2d 134 (1971) (constitutional home rule cities
exempt from restrictions of zoning enabling act). The reasoning is that constitutional
grants of power to local governments are binding on the legislature. "[T]he city de-
rives its power from the constitutional home rule provisions and not from state stat-
ute, any conflict between the ordinance and state statute [must be] resolved in favor of
the local ordinance." Id at 253-54, 484 P.2d at 136-37 (1971). See generally
Bermingham, 1974 Land Use Legislation in Colorado, 51 DEN. L.J. 467 (1974).
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Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
tional and statutory home rule provisions are similar. Both fall into
two main categories: those granting spec~ic, enumerated powers, 6
and those granting a general police power under which local govern-
ments may exercise all power within the scope of their local affairs
unless expressly limited by constitution, statute, or charter.'
7
New York is unusual in that it has both constitutional 8 and statu-
tory' 9 home rule provisions, combining enumerated powers20 with
limitations on the legislature's authority to act in relation to local
By contrast, Illinois courts have construed similar grants of power against local
governments. For an excellent discussion of the Illinois Supreme Court's ability to
ignore constitutional amendments increasing home rule powers, see Minetz, Recent
llinois Supreme Court Decisions Concerning the Authorit' of Home Rule Units to Con.
trol Local Enviornmental Problems, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 306 (1977).
16. Courts in [states granting specific powers] may take a narrow view of the
delegated authority .... In Canavan v. Messina, 31 Conn. Super. 447, 334, A.2d
237 (1973), the court found that the home rule municipality did not have the
power to establish a minimum age for its mayor in its charter. The home rule
statute listed 56 powers specifically to be enjoyed by home rule municipalities,
and then authorized these municipalities to "make all lawful regulations and or-
ders in furtherance of any of said powers." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-194 (1977).
The court noted that all powers possessed by home rule municipalities are "spe-
cifically derived" from the state, found no express power to establish a minimum
age requirement, and refused to imply one from the general grant of power just
quoted, especially as the state by statute had established its own minimum age
requirement for local
cers.
D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 187 (1977).
17. The Texas constitutional home rule provision ...simply provides that
'Cities. . .may. . . adopt or amend their charters, subject to such limitations as
may be prescribed by the Legislature. . . .' TEXAS CONST. art. XI, § 5. This
provision has been interpreted as a full grant of power to home rule municipali-
ties to do anything the legislature could have authorized them to do, so that legis-
lative acts need be looked to only for limitations on and not grants of power.
D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 187-188 (1977). See also Sandalow, supra note 4, at 644.
18. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § § 1-3.
19. N.Y. STAT. LOCAL Gov'Ts LAW § § 1-21 (McKinney 1969).
20. The constitution enumerates 18 specific grants of power concerning local leg-
islation and administration of local governmental functions plus a general grant of
police power. N.Y. Const. art IX, § § 1-2. Enumerated by statute are seven specific
powers: local legislation, acquisition of real and personal property, acquisition of
parks, disposition of real and personal property, rent control, zoning, and planning,
N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV'Ts LAW § § 10(l)-10(7) (McKinney 1969).
For an excellent analysis of the powers granted and restrictions retained in the New
York Constitution, Municipal Home Rule Law, and Statute of Local Governments,




governments.2 ' While the delegation of authority seems broad, judi-
cial interpretation has consistently construed grants of local authority
against the locality. 22 Likewise, the judiciary has diluted the consti-
tutional prohibition of legislation dealing with local property, affairs,
or government.2 3
21. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1) quoted at note 12 supra; N.Y. STAT. LOCAL
GOV'Ts LAW § 2(b) (McKinney 1969): "Powers may be repealed, diminished, im-
paired or suspended only by the enactment of a statute by the legislature with the
approval of the governor at its regular session in one calendar year and the re-enact-
ment and approval of such statute in the following calendar year."
The constitutional reservation reads: "Except as expressly provided, nothing in this
article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to: . . . (3)
[m]atters other than the properir. affairs or government of a local government." N.Y.
CONST. art. IX. § 3(a)(3) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Statute of Local Govern-
ments provides:
The legislature hereby excludes from the scope of the grants of powers to local
governments in this statute and reserves to itself the right and power to enact any
law described in this section notwithstanding the fact that it repeals, diminishes,
impairs or suspends a power granted to one or more local governments in this
statute: . . . 4. [a]ny law relating to a matter other than the property affairs or
government of a local government.
N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV'Ts LAW § 11.4 (McKinney 1969) (emphasis added).
22. "The New York courts have almost uniformly applied a maxim of construc-
tion known as 'Dillon's Rule' under which all grants of local authority are narrowly
construed against the locality." Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (1966). See, e.g., Town of Brookhaven v. Parr Co. of
Suffolk, 76 Misc. 2d 378, 350 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1973), modi/iedon other grounds, 47 A.D.
2d 554, 363 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1975) (town had no right to require building and occu-
pancy permit from defendant who had obtained a license from the state Racing and
Wagering Board); Holland v. Bankson, 178 Misc. 810, 35 N.Y.S.2d 250, af'd, 264
A.D. 896, 36 N.Y.S.2d 431, appeal granted, 264 A.D. 955, 37 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1942),
revd, 290 N.Y. 267, 49 N.E.2d 16, 42 N.Y.S.2d (1943) (city right to regulate hours,
tours of duty and hours off duty of its firemen subject to statewide legislation).
23. See. e.g., Toia v. Regan, 54 A.D.2d 46, 387 N.Y.S.2d 309, aJ'd, 40 N.Y.2d
837, 356 N.E.2d 276, 387 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1082 (1977)
(court denied county's objection to state law which imposed 50% of non-federal cost
of public assistance on local government despite the county's argument that resulting
restrictions on tax revenues severely reduced its ability to manage its own affairs);
Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935) (court upheld establish-
ment of a sewage authority for the City of Buffalo through an act which imposed
restrictions and obligations on one particular municipality as a means of protecting
water in Lake Erie, the Niagara River, and Lake Ontario); Smith v. Jansen, 85 Misc.
2d 81, 379 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1975) (court validated an act abolishing the Board of Trust-
ees of Suffolk Cooperative Library System and providing for the election of a new
Board because of the state's interest in public education); Whalen v. Wagner, 2 Misc.
2d 89, 152 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1957), affid, 4 N.Y.2d 575, 152 N.E.2d 54, 176 N.Y.S.2d 616
(1958) (despite findings that city streets and highways are property relating to the
affairs of the city, court upheld legislation concerning New York City bridges and
roads as part of the state highway system for all state citizens traveling to and from
19791
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Adler v. Deegan,24 the landmark decision on home rule in New
York, upheld the Multiple-Dwelling Law. That law applied only to
New York City but failed to receive the two-thirds legislative ap-
proval required for such "special legislation." 5 The Adler court
found that laws dealing with matters of concern to the public at large,
though immediately affecting particular localities, constitute valid ex-
ercises of state legislative power.26 Adler established three standards
for determining when the state has authority to enact legislation af-
fecting and touching upon local matters. The majority opinion
adopted a standard that requires a narrow interpretation of local
powers. 27 Cardozo's concurrence advocated a standard allowing in-
trusion into local affairs if the legislation covers a matter of "state
concern." 28 Finally, the third standard sought to uphold general laws
New York City). See Note, Home Rule and the New York Consilution, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 1145, 1151 (1966).
24. 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929). Adler's narrow construction of local pow-
ers occurred just five years after New York adopted the 1924 constitutional amend-
ments in an effort to strengthen local powers. One commentator criticized the Adler
decision as "sounding the virtual death knell for home rule as its sponsors envisaged
it." Diamond, Some Observations on Local Government in New York State, 8 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 27, 35 (1958).
25. See Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145
(1966). At the time of the Adler decision the legislature could act within the "prop-
erty, affairs or government" of a municipality pursuant to an emergency message of
the governor only if it obtained the approval by two-thirds of the members of each
house. See N.Y. CoNsT. art XII, § 2 (1923). This condition remains in the present
constitution. N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(b)(2).
26. 251 N.Y. at 474, 167 N.E. at 707. The Adler court relied on City of New York
v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N.E. 836 (1929) which held that a legisla-
tive boundary change was not a law within the home rule provision although nothing
so clearly affects the property or government of a city as its jurisdiction.
27. Judge Crane propounded the first standard, narrow interpretation of local
powers. See Manes v. Golden, 400 F. Supp. 23 (1975), af'd, 423 U.S. 1068 (1976)
(upholding a local law setting filing fee in the Superior Court); Burke v. Krug, 161
Misc. 687, 292 N.Y.S. 851 (1936) (denying a challenge to an act authorizing a new
form of county government on the basis that it did not affect local government).
28. The second test is called the "state concern" doctrine, ie., the legislature may
act on matters of state concern even fsuch actions affect the property, affairs or gov-
ernment of a local government. See, e.g., Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 196
N.E. 740 (1935) (state concern for the life and health of communities taking water
supply from Lake Erie, the Niagara River, and Lake Ontario sufficient to impose
obligation of a sewage authority on the City of Buffalo); Matter of Freedman v. Suf-
folk County Bd. of Supervisors, 29 App. Div. 2d 661, 286 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1968), afd,
25 N.Y.2d 873, 250 N.E.2d 877, 303 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1969) (state concern for quality of
social service personnel sufficient to uphold act allowing extra compensation to local




designed to protect the health and welfare of citizens, though applica-
ble to only one locality. z9 Although the state concern doctrine arising
from Adler received the greatest judicial acceptance, later courts have
used all three standards to almost routinely deny home rule chal-
lenges to legislaton.3 °
In an attempt to stop judicial erosion of home rule powers, New
York adopted a constitutional amendment in 1963. 3 1 The amend-
ment directed the legislature to enact a Statute of Local Govern-
ments32 granting specific powers and protecting those powers from
state encroachment by the double enactment procedure.3 3 This inno-
vative provision was expressly aimed at providing "a reservoir of se-
lected significant powers" for local governments34 and protecting
those powers from hasty and ill-considered legislative judgments.35
Additionally, the constitutional amendment called for liberal con-
struction of delegated powers36 while the resulting Statute of Local
York, 24 App. Div. 2d 151, 266 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 606, 215 N.E. 2d
684, 268 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1966) (state concern for continuity of services for education,
health, housing, and transportation sufficient to uphold act authorizing mayor of New
York City to issue bonds for payment of city's pension liabilities); Modjeska Sign
Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 87 Misc. 2d 600, 386 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1976), aft'd, 55 App. Div. 2d
340, 390 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1977) (state concern for aesthetics sufficient to regulate adver-
tising signs in the Catskill and Adirondack Parks).
29. The third test, found in Judge Pound's concurrence, is based on the "spe-
cial/general law" theory previously discussed at note 14 supra. This test extends the
state concern doctrine by labeling laws aimed at the health and welfare of city resi-
dents as "general." It also supports laws which are general in their terms but applica-
ble to only one locality. See, e.g., County of Orange v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,
71 Misc. 2d 691, 337 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1970), ajf'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 839, 332 N.Y.S.2d
420 (1971) (validating act authorizing acquisition for an airport expansion as a matter
of general state concern); Burke v. Krug, 161 Misc. 687, 292 N.Y.S. 851 (1936) (act
applicable to one county by description of population distribution held "general").
30. See Diamond, Some Observations on Local Government in New York State, 8
BUFFALO L. REV. 27, 35 (1958); Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66
COLUM. L. REV., 1145, 1149-51 (1966).
31. The constitutional amendments were adopted November 5, 1963, to be effec-
tive January 1, 1964. N.Y. CoNsT. art. IX. The Statute of Local Governments en-
acted pursuant to the constitution became law March 29, 1964 (effective July 1, 1965).
32. N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV'Ts LAW (McKinney 1969).
33. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
34. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d at 496, 362 N.E.2d at 586, 393
N.Y.S.2d at 953-54 (1977).
35. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d at 492, 362 N.E.2d at 583, 393
N.Y.S.2d at 950.
36. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(c) "Rights, powers, privileges and immunities
granted to local governments by this article shall be liberally construed." Id
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Governments contained rules of construction affording even broader
protection.37 Planning and zoning were among the selected powers
specifically granted.38
37. N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV'Ts LAW § 20 (McKinney 1969).
Where a power granted by this statute [planning and zoning] relates to the prop-
erty, affairs or government of a local government, its inclusion herein shall not be
deemed to imply that the legislature has construed such power as not relating to
the property, affairs or government of such local government or as restricting the
powers of such local government.
Id at § 20(1).
Nothing in this statute shall operate to restrict the meaning of or diminish or
impair any power granted to a local government.
Id at § 20(2).
No power granted in this statute [planning and zoning] shal be deemed repealed.
diminished, impaired or suspended by the enactment of any subsequent act of
the legislature, unless such act shall be enacted and re-enacted as prescribed...
and unless such act shall contain a specic reference to this statute.
Id at § 20(3) (emphasis added).
Powers granted to local governments by this statute shall
iberally construed.
Id at § 20(5).
These detailed rules of construction were added in an effort to overcome the restric-
tive judicial interpretation of local powers. See Diamond, Some Observations on Lo-
cal Government in New York State, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 27 (1958): "The Court of
Appeals has often reiterated that the constitution must be given 'the meaning which
the words convey to an intelligent, careful voter. . . .' But the home rule amend-
ments. . . are construed in quite a different manner by that court, at least as far as
'property, affairs and government' are concerned." Id at 35. But see R. ANDERSON,
NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.02 (1963) (Supp. 1968):
These measures [1963 and 1964 revisions] have made little, if any, impact upon
the power of a city to adopt and enforce zoning ordinances. . . . [T]he statute
itself provides. . . that the powers granted therein "shall at all times be subject
to such purposes, standards and procedures as the legislature may have hereto-
fore prescribed or may hereafter prescribe." This language appears to preserve
the existing statutory limitations on the zoning power and to constitute it subject
to subsequent limitations enacted in the usual single-shot manner.
Id
38. N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV'Ts LAW §§ 10(6), 10(7) (McKinney 1969). This stat-
ute provided additional protection for powers which New York had traditionally con-
sidered local affairs. New York City enacted the first comprehensive zoning
ordinance in the country. Building Zone Ordinance of the City of New York (1916).
It was passed under a state enabling act, N.Y. LAWS 1914, ch. 470, and was upheld in
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920).
The New York enabling act and New York City zoning ordinance became the pat-
terns for essentially all early zoning and enabling acts. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING § 2.07 (1968). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
zoning ordinance based on the New York pattern in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). That landmark decision validated use of the police




Wambat was the first home rule case alleging suspension of an
enumerated power.39 Affirming the trial court's summary judg-
ment,4" the Court of Appeals construed the reservations of power to
act on "matters other than the property, affairs or government of lo-
cal governments"'" as allowing the state to enact any legislation pur-
porting to deal with matters of state conern.42 By phrasing the issue
in terms of the state's power to "override local interests" 43 and decid-
ing the case on the basis of the state concern doctrine,' 4 the court
residential areas from expanding commercial and industrial uses. Protection of the
economic value of residential districts and economy in municipal administration of
street maintenance, police and fire protection were the primary concerns of the Court.
39. Since the enactment of the Statute of Local Governments, three cases have
dealt with the state's interest in rent control, a power granted to local governments
with zoning and planning. In each of these cases the local government challenge was
by traditional objections on the "special law/general law" theory or on the "property,
affairs or government" theory. See Kerr v. Urstadt, 33 N.Y.2d 134, 305 N.E.2d 760,
350 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1973); 241 East 22nd St. Corp. v. City Rent Agency, 33 N.Y.2d
134, 305 N.E. 2d 760, 350 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1973); City of New York v. State of New
York, 31 N.Y.2d 804, 291 N.E. 2d 583, 339 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1972).
40. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 85 Misc. 2d 489, 378 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1976).
41. N.Y. CoNsrT, art IX, § 3(a)(3) and N.Y. STAT. LOCAL Gov'Ts LAw § 11.4
(McKinney 1969), quoted at note 21 supra.
42. While decreeing that preservation and development of the vast "Adirondack
spaces" related to "life, health, and the quality of life," the court failed to cite a single
authority supporting the state's interest in resources on privately-owned forest lands.
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 362 N.E.2d 581, 585, 393
N.Y.S.2d 949, 953. See discussion of state concern doctrine at note 28 supra.
43. "The issue is. . .whether the State may override local or parochial interests
when State concerns are involved. That issue is and has been resolved in favor of
State primacy. The price of strong local government may not be the destruction or
even the serious impairment of strong State interests." Wambat Realty Corp. v. State,
41 N.Y.2d 490, 497, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586-87, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954-55 (1977).
44. To support its state concern analysis, the court relied primarily on Floyd v.
New York State Urb. Dev. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 1, 300 N.E.2d 704, 347 N.Y.S. 161 2d
(1973), which allowed the state to plan and execute a housing project in disregard of
local zoning ordinances. This reliance is unfortunate because the state concern at
issue in Fliord was not a specifically delegated and protected power but housing-a
matter long accepted as a legitimate area for exercise of the state police power. Since
courts frequently exempt state agencies from local ordinances, the case is not analo-
gous to the developer's claim that the APAA completely emasculates constitutionally
protected planning and zoning powers. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM, 194 (1977). See also Town of
Brookhaven v. Suffolk Meadows Quarter Horse Racing Ass'n, 76 Misc. 2d 175, 350
N.Y.S.2d 525 (1973) (where State Quarter Horse Racing Commission approved loca-
tion for defendant to conduct quarter horse races at which pari mutuel betting [state's
concern] would be conducted, defendant was exempt from local zoning ordinances).
Levi, Gehring & Groethe, Application of Municipal Ordinances to Special Purpose Dis-
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failed to answer the question raised by the litigation. The real issue
was whether the legislature must employ constitutionally mandated
procedures when state action impairs or suspends specific home rule
powers. The Wambat decision implies a negative answer.4
5
A cursory review of the APAA reveals strong support for the devel-
oper's claim that the APAA encroaches on local planning and zoning
powers. By dividing the private land into categories with develop-
ment intensity restrictions,46 the APAA virtually prohibits all second
home developments.47 Sections of the APAA restrict development,
48
tricts and Regulated Industries, 12 URBAN L. ANN. 77 (1976); Note, ImmuniOy of State
and State-Related Activitiesfrom Local Municioal Zoning Regluations." Florida Focus,
28 U. FLA. L. REv. 800 (1976). Contra, City of Pittsburg v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa.
174, 176, 360 A.2d 607, 609 (1976) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed lower
court approval of state action where state located a pre-release center in Pittsburgh
without applying for an occupancy permit or zoning authorization, saying "we do not
find that the Legislature intended the Bureau of Corrections to be immune from local
zoning regulations.").
45. One week after the decision in Wambat the Court of Appeals relied on that
case in Board of Educ. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 535, 362 N.E.2d 948, 394
N.Y.S.2d 148 (1977), to uphold the Stravisky-Goodman Law, N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 2576(5) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). That law required the City of New York to
appropriate for public elementary and secondary education at least an amount equal
to the average proportion of the total expense budget as awarded in the three fiscal
years preceding. Not only is this a "special law" applicable to New York City alone,
but it also infringes on the city's power to manage its fiscal obligations-both of
which are prohibited by the constitution. N.Y. CONST. art IX, § 2(b)(2) ("[the legisla-
ture] shall have the power to act in relation to the property, affairs or government of
any local government only by general law. . ."); id § 2(c) (local governments have
power to transact business and incur obligations). The court found that the state's
interest in education made the law a matter of state concern. Relying on Wambat and
over two strong dissents, the court reversed the two lower courts and held that home
rule was no bar to legislation directed to matters of state concern. 41 N.Y.2d 535, 362
N.E.2d 948, 394 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1977). Thus the judiciary has completely defeated the
purpose of the 1963 home rule amendments.
46. The method of selecting the categories has been described as:
A system of land use classifications based upon soils, topography, water, fragile
ecosystems, vegetation, wildlife, park character, public facilities, existing land use
patterns, and other public and social considerations was laid out graphically on a
map of the region. By limiting the uses deemed compatible in each classification
and by limiting the intensity of development in each classification, development
is channeled into the areas of the Park most amenable to, and best able to with-
stand, that development.
David, Land Use Control and Enviornmental Protection in the Adirondacks, 47 N.Y.S.
B.J. 189, 191 n.14 (1975).
47. While the development intensity restrictions are worded in terms of principal
buildings per square mile to encourage clustering buildings in areas most able to sup-




require Agency approval of local land use plans, require that local
land use plans conform to the official state plan,49 and subject certain
developments to Agency review and approval irrespective of local ap-
proval." These provisions appear to impair the planning and zoning
powers of the one hundred nineteen local governments within the
Park." Indeed, the court admitted: "Of course the [APAA] prevents
localities. . . from freely exercising their. . . powers. That indeed is
its purpose and effect. . . the motive is to serve a supervening state
concern transcending local interests." 52
The problem with the court's analysis is that it renders meaningless
the clear and unambiguous protection of specifically granted powers
in the 1963 constitutional and statutory amendments, 53 and leaves
the New York courts with a dangerously broad principle. It implies
that any state interest in legislation constitutes adequate grounds for
the legislature to ignore home rule delegations of power.
A thorough analysis of the APAA's impact on local planning and
Percent of Total
Classification Private Land Average Lot Size
Resource Management 53% 42.7
Rural 32% 8.5
Low intensity 10% 3.2
Moderate intensity * 1.3
Hamlet * n/a
Industrial * n/a
• These three areas together total 5% of the privately-owned Park land and
include areas which are already highly developed. See Kalish, Environ-
mental Protection, in GOVERNING NEW YORK STATE (Academy of Politi-
cal Science ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Kalish]; Booth, supra note 9, at
624.
48. N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 27, § § 805.3d-805.3g (McKinney 1972) as amended
(McKinney Supp. 1972-1978).
49. Id at § § 807-808.
50. Id at § § 809-811.
51. The [Agency] has authority to . . .[review] . . .local land use legislation
within the Park, an area about the size of the State of Vermont. Specifically, the
Park boundaries enclose one entire county, parts of eleven other counties, and
part of all of 87 towns. Agency review to determine compliance with the plan is
mandatory and extends to amendments as well as original land use control legis-
lation.
Anderson, Land Use Control, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 457, 458 (1974).
52. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y. 2d at 494-95, 362 N.E. 2d at 584, 393
N.YS.2d at 952 (1977).
53. See notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra.
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zoning, of the local governments' participation in the development of
the APAA zoning plan,54 and of prior home rule decisions may have
allowed the court to uphold the APAA without such blatant denial of
unambiguous constitutional guarantees. The case thus should have
proceeded to a trial on the merits to determine if the APAA actuallv
repeals, diminishes, impairs, or suspends local planning and zoning
powers.
The home rule advocates in New York, who apparently receive
greater cooperation from the legislature than from the courts, 55 suc-
ceeded in blocking passage of the APAA until a number of com-
promises were made which gave local governments a strong voice in
setting the final guidelines of the APAA official plan. 6 In its final
form, the APAA not only permits but encourages local planning and
zoning by making financial and technical assistance available to local
governments.5 7 After obtaining local approval, many projects will
not require Agency review.58 Furthermore, Agency approval does
54. The official Adirondack Park Land Use and Development Plan prepared by
the Agency as a guide to land use planning and development throughout the entire
area of the park was adopted by N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 27, § 805 (McKinney 1972) as
amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978).
55. See Kalish, supra note 47, at 256, 259-60; Note, New York State Planning Law
Revision.- The Lost Necessity?, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1021, 1051 (1973) (planners cited
the strength of the home rule lobby as the primary reason for defeat of the statewide
planning law revision).
See also NRDC, supra note 8, at 111. "'Both the assembly and the senate voted to
postpone all action [on the APAA] for one year but this message was vetoed by the
Governor. Passage of the bill instituting the law was possible only after a number of
compromises were made." Id Accord Kalish, supra note 47, at 259.
56. The following changes illustrate such compromises: 1) A Local Government
Review Board was established consisting of one representative from each of the
twelve counties within the Park to advise and assist the Agency; 2) The state agreed to
continue payments to local governments in lieu of taxes on forest preserve lands. 3)
The amount of state money available for local planning was increased, and 4) An-
other full-time resident of the Adirondacks was added to the Agency, increasing to
five the number of local representatives on the eleven-member agency. NRDC. supra
note 8, at 112. Additionally, the maximum population limit for the park was in-
creased by 65%, from 1,200,000 to 2,000,000. This increase allowed substantial expan-
sion from the current population of 125,000. Kalish, supra note 47, at 259.
57. NRDC, supra note 8, at 112. See Booth, supra note 9, at 619. See also the
provision of the APAA directing the Agency to provide technical services to local
governments. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 807(6) (McKinney 1972) as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1972-1978).
58. Booth, supra note 9, at 620, 628. See also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 810 (McKinney




not negate the requirement of local approval.59
Although a decision on the merits may have produced the same
ultimate result, it would not have stripped local governments of the
protection of local powers provided by the constitution.6" While the
decision is a victory for preservation of the natural resources of the
Park, it is certainly a defeat for "the preservation of our constitu-
tional system of government."'" New York's interest in the one
should be no more--but no less--than its interest in the other.
Jane E. Leonard
59. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 818 (McKinney 1972) as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1972-1978); Booth, supra note 9, at 629. Accord, Davis, Land Use Control and En'i-
ronmental Protection in the Adirondacks, 47 N.Y.S. B.J. 189 (1975). In this article, an
attorney for the Adirondack Park Agency explained:
[U]nlike the scheme in Art. 7 of the ALl Model Land Dev. Code, which places
local ordinances in abeyance until approved by the State Land Planning Agency,
the Act [APAA] expressly allows for local regulation parallel to and independent
of itself... Moreover, any other course of action could be circumscribed in
New York. N.Y. CONST. art. IX.
Id at 223 n.40.
The California Court of Appeals relied in a similar analysis in CEEED v. Califor-
nia Coastal Zone Conserv. Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).
In CEEED. the court held that the act establishing the Commission did not intrude
on the municipal affairs of chartered cities in violation of the California home rule
statutes because the agency permit required for development was in addition to any
permits required by local ordinance. Id at 320, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 325. If the Wambat
court had used the CEEED analysis, it would have avoided the constitutional ques-
tion. The problem with this reasoning is that it views the power to regulate as the
power to limit and totally ignores the fact that local governments may want to en-
courage increases in population density or industrial development. Wambat is an
excellent example of a local government's desire for growth being daunted by a state
environmental statute.
60. Wambat may be a forecast of the judicial response to a home rule challenge to
the recently enacted Environmental Quality Review Act (EQRA). N.Y. ENvIR. CON-
SERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). By its terms the
EQRA could require detailed impact statements before local governments could issue
building permits or enact zoning ordinances. Id § 8-0105. EQRA requires all state
and local agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement on any action they
plan or approve which may have a significant effect on the environment. Id § 8-
0 109(2). See Strainere, Land Use in New York: An Evaluation of Polir and Perform-
ance, 40 ALBANY L. REV. 643 at 723, 725-27 (1976); Comment, The New York State
Environmental Quality Review Act. An Overview andAnalysis 41 ALBANY L. REV. 293
(1977).
61. See Brief for Amicus Curiae at 17, Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y. 2d
490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977).
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